In the mid-to-late 2010s, I remember joking with friends and colleagues with an interest in passenger rail that we should take bets on which project will be the first to deliver world-class high speed rail to the U.S. At the time, it seemed like the race was between California’s public high-speed rail project (CAHSR, which had already started construction in segments, before it really started getting bogged down with legal & procedural hurdles and massive cost overruns) and the private Texas Central project to connect Dallas with Houston. More recently, though, I would have been more willing to put money on Brightline West — a private-led venture with public financial backing with the aim of connecting Las Vegas with Southern California. Brightline West seemed to have a smoother path toward commencing operations by its revised target of late 2029, well in advance of CAHSR (whose initial Central Valley segment won’t be operable until 2032 at the very earliest) and Texas Central (now under Amtrak’s aegis and seemingly on ice, with no clear path towards starting construction any time soon).
This year, however, Brightline’s mounting financial troubles are casting growing doubt on the company’s ability to pull off such a feat. Despite having operated nearly hourly daytime service in Florida for nearly a decade as the country’s only private (non-Amtrak) operator of regularly scheduled intercity passenger trains, it is now an open question whether Brightline will still be in business (at least in Florida) by the end of this year. The company is getting bankruptcy-loan proposals from creditors as it carries roughly $5.5 billion in debt. Its insolvency would be one of the largest defaults in U.S. municipal bond history.
With 3.5 million boardings in 2025 (1.9 million of those being to or from Orlando), Brightline serves about 10% of the air-rail market between Orlando and South Florida, a much higher rail share than anywhere other than New York to Washington, Boston, Harrisburg or Albany. In terms of passenger-miles per train-mile, Brightline Florida performs better than all Amtrak routes outside of the Northeast Corridor, with load factors (percentage of available seats occupied by fare-paying passengers) generally averaging between 50% and 80%. Nevertheless, patronage has failed to meet the company’s very optimistic projection of 4.5 million long-distance boardings by this year.
Brightline has made sensible adjustments to its Florida operations, reducing Orlando service to roughly once every two hours while increasing Miami-West Palm Beach frequencies and replacing dynamic pricing with fixed peak-versus-off-peak pricing for the South Florida commuter market. This combined with increased average long-distance fares and increased ancillary revenue (from on-board & station food, beverage & merchandise purchases and advertising sales) led to year-over-year revenue increases outpacing modest ridership gains. However, the company’s recent audited financial statements and credit downgrades paint a pretty ugly picture.
The Florida operating company alone carries over $2 billion out of the $5.5 billion total debt carried by Brightline and its parent and affiliated companies. Outside auditor Ernst & Young flagged “substantial doubt” about Brightline’s ability to remain a going concern due to its lack of sufficient liquid funds to meet its current obligations. Roughly 54 cents of every dollar the company earned in 2025 went to interest payments, reducing its cash position by 52%. Without sufficient revenue from passengers or from station-adjacent real estate holdings to cover the interest on its construction debt, Brightline’s cash reserves could be completely exhausted by January 2027.
Chapter 11 bankruptcy seems the most likely short-term outcome, with creditor groups already actively bidding on “bankruptcy loans” that would maintain Florida operations but transfer ownership from Fortress Investment Group to the creditors. Eventually, I would not be surprised to see Amtrak given an offer to take over the Florida service, perhaps with some public assistance. But where does this leave Brightline West? Even though there are firewalls between the corporate and financing structures of the Vegas project and the Florida operation, the projected construction cost for Brightline West has swelled from an initial estimate of $12 billion to over $21 billion — thanks to the familiar combination of inflation, labor shortages and supply chain difficulties — causing private capital markets to show hesitation at absorbing that level of risk.
Furthermore, Brightline West’s late 2025 move to execute a public exchange of its $2.5 billion in Series 2025A California infrastructure bonds indicates that the company likely underwent some behind-the-scenes restructuring to sustain its bondholder base. And even though a bankruptcy in Florida would not directly impact the California project, it would damage the facade of ‘profitable private passenger rail’ in America in the eyes of both the public and investors. It would be much harder and more expensive to raise the remaining capital for Brightline West if investors watch Florida bondholders take massive losses.
Brightline West is by no means a goner, though, even if Brightline Florida goes belly-up and ceases operations. The Vegas project enjoys much more government backing than the Miami-Orlando undertaking ever did — the Federal Railroad Administration has already committed a $3 billion grant for its construction, and the company is seeking an additional $6 billion federal loan. And pre-construction work is already well underway: utility work and field surveys are ongoing along the I-15 corridor and construction contracts have been signed. Finally, Brightline’s January hiring of former Eurostar CEO Nicholas Petrovic signals its intent to bring institutional discipline to its business on both sides of the country.
Even with the impending insolvency of Brightline Florida, I still wouldn’t count Brightline West out. The Orlando-Miami line proved that the concept of privately-financed and operated intercity passenger rail can work in the U.S., even though the private capital structure ultimately failed. The Florida operation’s solid revenue may ensure that it keeps running under new creditor ownership, or perhaps under Amtrak. However, the destitution in the Sunshine State means that the Golden State project may not be able to rely on Wall Street to cross the finish line. If it is to be completed, it will likely come at the cost of further delays and even more federal investment, or even a federal takeover, the likelihood of which probably depends on the outcome of the 2026 and 2028 elections, even though the project enjoys more support from the current administration than CAHSR.
I rode Brightline in South Florida twice before the pandemic, and took one round-trip between Orlando and South Florida in September 2023 shortly after the extension opened. All three times, I was impressed with the ride quality, the equipment’s condition and appealing interior, and the enthusiastically friendly service from the on-board crews and station staff. The upgraded Florida East Coast line between Cocoa and West Palm Beach, which accommodates both 90-mph passenger and 70-mph freight trains (primarily double-stack container hauls) with mostly double and some triple track and minimal delays (except for the notoriously high number of grade crossing collisions, which I was lucky not to have experienced) is a model for what so many Class I mainlines on well-traveled corridors could become with a relatively modest level of investment compared to building entirely new railroads (or even building one highway interchange).
The company has a solid foundation and generally gets all the basics of providing a competitive (in terms of travel time, frequency, reliability and amenities) transportation service right. If Brightline can transfer this mindset to the Mojave Desert, where at least grade crossings won’t be an issue, and come up with a workable financing scheme, I still stand a chance of riding America’s first world-class high-speed trains between Sin City and Rancho Cucamonga.

